When Dricus Du Plessis defeated Kamaru Usman in the UFC Oklahoma City main event, the easiest explanations appeared immediately:

• Usman was older.
• Usman had moved up from welterweight.
• Du Plessis was the naturally larger middleweight.
• Usman was no longer the same fighter who once ruled the welterweight division.

All of those points mattered.

Age affects speed, recovery, durability, and the ability to repeatedly rebuild offense. Size makes every clinch, collision, and failed takedown more expensive. Moving into a heavier division means the same physical effort may no longer produce the same reaction from the opponent.

But those explanations only describe the conditions.

They do not explain the mechanism.

They do not explain why Usman struggled to establish his jab, why his pressure rarely pushed Du Plessis into predictable retreats, or why his wrestling attempts appeared disconnected from the rest of his offense.

They also do not explain how DDP’s awkward rhythm, high-kick threats, physical collisions, and intercepting attacks kept breaking Usman’s system before it could fully develop.

Du Plessis won the fight by unanimous decision, with scorecards of 50-45, 49-46, and 49-46. The result looked dominant. The deeper story was not simply that DDP was younger, bigger, or stronger.

It was that Kamaru Usman could never build his fight.

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What Kamaru Usman Normally Builds

At his peak, Usman was not simply a wrestler with a strong jab. His greatness came from how those weapons connected.

• The jab established his presence.
• The forward pressure made opponents retreat.
• The retreat created access to the fence.
• The fence reduced their movement.

Once the opponent could no longer freely circle away, Usman connected his punches to level changes, body locks, and prolonged control.

His system looked something like this:

Jab and forward pressure ➡️ Opponent retreats ➡️ Fence becomes available ➡️ Punches connect to wrestling ➡️ Control, damage, and accumulated pressure

That chain was the foundation of championship Usman.

Against Tyron Woodley, he did not need to sprint recklessly into takedowns. He took space, pressured Woodley backward, crowded his reactions, and built the wrestling once the cage had removed the exits.

Against Leon Edwards in their second fight, Usman spent long stretches forcing Edwards backward, connecting striking pressure to clinch control, takedowns, and positional dominance.

The wrestling was not supposed to appear from nowhere, but it was delivered by the pressure.

Usman’s takedowns were rarely meant to begin the system. They were supposed to arrive after his jab and forward movement had already built the walls.

That distinction matters.

A naked takedown is one attack.
A takedown hidden behind a jab, retreat, fence position, and defensive reaction is the final layer of a larger problem.

Against Du Plessis, the walls were never properly built.

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DDP Denied the First Layer and That’s Enough

Usman still used his jab in Oklahoma City.

He still feinted and still moved forward at times.

But he did not establish those weapons with the same immediate authority that defined his championship years.

Rather than taking the center and forcing DDP to react from the opening seconds, Usman spent more time reading, feinting, and cautiously testing the distance.

That caution was understandable.

Du Plessis is not an opponent who gives clean information.

He can stand at range looking almost inactive, then suddenly explode forward behind a looping combination, high kick, knee, or physical collision.

Usman could not simply walk into his old pressure pattern and expect DDP to retreat in a straight, readable line.

Du Plessis used several weapons to stop the first layer from becoming comfortable:

• His high kicks forced Usman to respect attacks above the guard.
• His knees occupied the space where Usman wanted to lower his level.
• His awkward hand combinations met Usman during entries rather than waiting for him to finish setting his feet.
• His physical strength meant that even incomplete exchanges carried a cost.

Every high-kick threat also had extra meaning against a fighter whose career had already been changed by Leon Edwards’ head kick.

That does not mean DDP was consciously trying to reopen a psychological wound. We cannot know exactly what was happening inside either fighter’s mind.

But the weapon still carried tactical weight.

Usman could not casually dip, lower his posture, or step into range without accounting for the kick and knee.

The result was a version of Usman who could throw the jab but could not make the jab organize the fight.

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DDP Made Every Entry Messy

Dricus Du Plessis does not fight with a rhythm that looks comfortable on replay.

• His footwork can appear awkward.
• His combinations can look wide.
• His posture sometimes seems ready to collapse before he suddenly crashes into range with another attack.

But the visual awkwardness often hides a very functional system.

DDP changes speed, distance, and rhythm before the opponent can establish a clean pattern:

• He can begin slowly, wait for information, then burst forward with several attacks at once.
• Or he can throw while retreating.
• Or he can collide physically at the end of combinations.
• Or he can attack during the opponent’s reset, before they have rebuilt their stance.

Against Usman, this rhythm became one of the central tactical problems:

Usman wanted a readable entry. He wanted to step behind the jab, establish his position, force DDP backward, and then connect the striking exchange to wrestling.

And Du Plessis kept changing the timing before that sequence could settle.

The pattern often looked like this:

Slow read ➡️ Sudden burst ➡️ Awkward combination, high kick, or knee ➡️ Physical collision ➡️ Reset before Usman rebuilds pressure

Unlike Khamzat Chimaev, who may immediately pressure and attack the takedown, Usman gave Du Plessis more time to settle into the opening minutes.

That time allowed DDP to prepare the mess. Once Usman began entering, Du Plessis met him with attacks that did not arrive in a clean, predictable beat:

When Usman expected a pause, DDP accelerated.
When Usman tried to establish his jab, DDP interrupted with a combination or high attack.
And when Usman reset after the entry, DDP could attack before the next sequence had formed.

Du Plessis only needed every Usman entry to feel contaminated.

That is the strange effectiveness of DDP’s style.

His offense often looks chaotic from the outside, but the chaos prevents the opponent from developing a stable rhythm.

Robert Whittaker experienced a similar problem. Whittaker is one of the best rhythm strikers in the middleweight division, but DDP’s physical bursts and awkward pressure kept breaking the clean movement patterns he wanted.

Against Usman, the same disruptive quality attacked a different system:

Whittaker wanted striking rhythm.
Usman wanted pressure-wrestling rhythm.

And this South African guy Du Plessis made both feel uncomfortable.

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The Head Kicks Were More Than Damage

The high kicks became one of the most visible weapons in the fight. They threatened damage, but they also affected how Usman entered.

A wrestler needs posture flexibility. Usman must be able to lower his stance, change levels, step close enough to reach the hips, and connect his hands before the opponent escapes.

High kicks and knees punish that pathway:

• If Usman lowered his head without enough setup, he risked meeting the kick.
• If he rushed forward behind an obvious level change, the knee occupied the center.
• If he remained upright to protect against those attacks, his takedown entry became longer and easier to read.

DDP did not need every high kick to land cleanly, the threat itself influenced Usman’s posture.

That is one of the hidden layers of striking in MMA.

A strike can be valuable even when it does not produce immediate damage. It can change how the opponent stands, remove a preferred reaction, or force hesitation before the next entry.

Du Plessis used the high attacks to make Usman’s route toward the hips more dangerous.

Once the level change became uncomfortable, Usman’s wrestling had to begin from less natural positions.

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Usman’s Wrestling Became Separated From His Striking

This was the central tactical failure.

The question is not simply how many takedowns Usman attempted, but “Did his punches create those wrestling opportunities?” or “Did the takedowns arrive as separate actions that Du Plessis could see coming?”

Against DDP, too many of Usman’s wrestling attempts appeared isolated: They came from outside his strongest range.

They were not always preceded by combinations that forced Du Plessis to shell high, or they did not consistently arrive after DDP had been pressured toward the fence.

The jab, pressure, and takedown were present as individual tools.

They were not functioning together as one system.

Prime Usman often worked through a connected sequence:

Jab ➡️ Opponent retreats ➡️ Fence limits movement ➡️ Level change becomes harder to escape ➡️ Usman controls

Against Du Plessis, the sequence frequently became:

Feint or isolated jab ➡️ Uncertain entry ➡️ Visible takedown attempt ➡️ DDP defends ➡️ Both fighters reset

That difference explains why the wrestling felt ineffective.

Usman did not suddenly forget how to wrestle. His body did not lose every technical memory from years of championship competition.

He lost the pathway that normally delivered him into wrestling range.

DDP could defend each shot as a single problem rather than defending the jab, pressure, fence position, and takedown at the same time.

That is much easier.

Elite MMA wrestling is rarely just about the shot. It is about making the opponent solve several problems before the shot arrives.

Usman could not create those layers consistently.

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DDP Kept Attacking the Rebuild

Stopping the first attack is not always enough against a system fighter, the better strategy is to stop the opponent from rebuilding after the first attempt fails.

Du Plessis did that well:

• Whenever Usman reset his stance, DDP threatened another burst.
• When Usman pulled away from a failed wrestling entry, DDP could pressure into the recovery.
• When Usman paused to reestablish the jab, DDP changed the rhythm with a kick, knee, or awkward combination.

This created a second problem for Usman: He was struggling to reload the entry.

The difference matters because Usman’s championship pressure was historically cumulative.

He could repeat the sequence, make the opponent defend again, and gradually remove their movement.

Against DDP, every failed layer created another delay.

• Usman had to reset his feet.
• Recheck the distance.
• Respect the high attacks.
• Account for DDP’s physical strength.
• Then begin again.

By the time the next sequence started, Du Plessis had already prepared another interruption.

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Why Size Mattered

Du Plessis’ natural middleweight size mattered, but not in the simple sense that “the bigger man wins.”

The size affected the cost of every action.

When Usman collided with DDP, he met a larger frame that was harder to move backward.
When a takedown failed, Usman had spent energy attacking someone accustomed to competing against middleweights.
When they clinched, DDP could use strength and balance to make the position more difficult to control.

Usman had fought physically powerful welterweights before, but middleweight presented a different type of resistance. That extra resistance alone made mistakes more expensive.

At welterweight, a partially successful entry might still produce enough forward movement to reach the fence.

Against DDP, the same attempt could stop in open space.

The larger body did not automatically defeat Usman’s wrestling. It gave DDP more time to recognize the entry, more stability to defend it, and more power to punish the reset.

Size increased the cost of everything, but it did not fully explain the entire system failure.

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Why Age Mattered

Usman entered the fight at a much later stage of his career than the version who dominated Woodley, Covington, Masvidal, and Burns.

Age does not always remove a fighter’s skills, but it often removes the ability to repeat them at the same intensity.

Peak Usman could pressure, fail, rebuild, pressure again, wrestle, separate, and restart the sequence without allowing the opponent much relief.

The older version appeared more selective.

That may have helped him preserve energy, but it also gave DDP more time to establish his own rhythm.

Against an opponent like Du Plessis, a slower rebuild becomes dangerous.

DDP grows inside disorder, every pause gives him time to choose another awkward entry, high kick, knee, or physical burst.

Usman did not necessarily need to be faster in one isolated moment. What he need is to rebuild his entire system more frequently.

That is where age may have mattered most.

Not in one failed takedown, but in the increasing cost of trying again.

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The Post-Knockout Version of Usman

Before the Leon Edwards knockout, Usman fought with the confidence of someone who believed the cage belonged to him.

• He pressured opponents immediately.
• He trusted his durability.
• He trusted that the wrestling threat would protect his striking entries.

And the head kick changed the story.

Since then, Usman has often appeared more selective about when he commits his pressure.

That does not mean he became mentally broken or permanently afraid. Fighters change for many reasons, including age, accumulated damage, tactical evolution, injuries, and the opponents placed in front of them.

But the difference is visible in Usman’s case.

The newer Usman spends more time reading before fully committing.

When he fought Joaquin Buckley back in his previous fight, Joaquin continuously push forward, left many holes in his rhythm. Usman can easily secured the takedown from those holes, even when he wasn’t rush for it.

Against DDP, the caution met an opponent who became more dangerous every second he was allowed to build rhythm.

The psychological history also made certain weapons carry more weight.

• Every high kick demanded respect.
• Every awkward burst raised the possibility that Usman could be caught before the wrestling connection formed.

Caution is not always weakness.

But against Du Plessis, caution prevented Usman from imposing the first layer strongly enough to control the fight.

Since the second Leon Edwards fight, Usman’s offense has gradually moved away from the relentless pressure that defined his championship run.

At his peak, Usman rarely gave opponents enough time to build their own rhythm. He took the center early, pushed them toward the fence, and repeatedly connected his striking to wrestling. Even when the first takedown failed, the pressure remained. The opponent still had to defend the jab, retreat, reset their stance, and prepare for the next entry.

His recent performances show a more cautious version of that system.

Usman now spends longer reading reactions before closing distance. He remains on the feet for extended periods, chooses his entries more carefully, and commits to fewer wrestling exchanges. This approach reduces immediate risk, though it also gives opponents more time to establish their own offense.

The Joaquin Buckley fight suggested that parts of the old Usman system were returning. His pace, pressure, and physical confidence appeared stronger. Dricus Du Plessis presented a much harsher test of that recovery.

Against a natural middleweight, Usman’s forward movement no longer produced the same retreat. DDP could absorb the collision, interrupt the entry, and force Usman to rebuild from open space. The chart reflects more than a simple decline in wrestling activity. It shows how Usman’s entire route toward wrestling has become less consistent.

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Was Usman Simply “Washed”?

Calling a fighter “washed” is one of the fastest ways to end an interesting discussion.

It turns several interacting problems into one lazy conclusion.

Usman is clearly no longer the exact version who built a 15-fight UFC winning streak and became one of the best pound-for-pound fighters in the sport.

But that does not mean the result was meaningless or entirely caused by decline.

• DDP still had to deny the jab.
• He still had to interrupt the pressure.
• He still had to defend the takedowns.
• He still had to manage a former champion for five rounds.

If age alone explained the fight, Du Plessis would not have needed any tactical system.

If size alone explained it, every larger middleweight would automatically dominate every formed welterweight.

The more accurate conclusion is that Usman’s decline in speed, recovery, and repeated pressure made him more vulnerable to exactly what DDP does well.

Du Plessis did not merely benefit from the decline.

He gave the decline the perfect environment to appear.

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What the Win Means for Dricus Du Plessis

This performance showed a more controlled version of DDP’s chaos.

He did not sprint recklessly into the first exchange.

He read Usman.
He allowed the former champion to reveal his preferred entries.
Then he disrupted those entries with high attacks, awkward combinations, physical resistance, and reliable takedown defense.

That is important because Du Plessis has often been described as a fighter who wins through toughness, cardio, and strange athletic chaos.

Against Usman, the chaos looked more structured.

He understood where the fight needed to be messy.
He also understood when to remain patient.
That makes the middleweight title picture more interesting.

Sean Strickland represents structured jab pressure, defensive shell work, and a predictable rhythm used with extreme consistency.

Khamzat Chimaev represents immediate grappling pressure, fast entries, and prolonged control.

Du Plessis represents the disorder.

He changes rhythm, collides physically, attacks from awkward positions, and forces opponents to fight inside exchanges that never feel properly organized.

A trilogy with Strickland would again test disorder against structure.

A rematch with Chimaev would test whether DDP can stop a grappling system that begins much faster than Usman’s did in Oklahoma City.

Either way, Du Plessis proved that he remains one of the division’s most difficult problems.

The round-by-round striking chart reveals an important change in the fight’s momentum.

Du Plessis made his largest offensive investment in Round 2. He repeatedly attacked the head, interrupted Usman’s entries, and forced him to operate under immediate defensive pressure. This was the round where DDP created the widest separation between them and established the physical tone of the fight.

From Round 3 onward, Du Plessis became less active while Usman gradually increased his output.

That change suggests Usman was beginning to understand the rhythm, even if he could not fully reverse the fight. He used more straight attacks, pushed DDP backward more often, and found longer periods where he could operate without being immediately disrupted.

The final minute of Round 5 showed the clearest version of that adjustment.

Usman defended a takedown, drove Du Plessis backward, and finished the fight throwing combinations while DDP retreated and covered against the fence. The rally did not erase the damage and control Du Plessis had accumulated across the earlier rounds. It did reveal that DDP’s pace was fading and that Usman had finally found a more reliable route forward.

The tragedy for Usman was timing.

He found his strongest pressure after the fight had already been decided. The final bell ended his momentum before we could learn whether that late sequence might have developed into something more dangerous.

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Final Thoughts: Usman Was Left Fighting in Separate Pieces

Kamaru Usman entered UFC Oklahoma City with all the familiar weapons still present.

• The jab.
• The pressure.
• The wrestling.
• The clinch.
• The experience.

But Du Plessis stopped those weapons from connecting.

Usman could jab, but the jab did not consistently organize the pressure.
He could move forward, but the pressure did not create predictable retreats.
He could attempt takedowns, but the takedowns were not hidden behind enough striking or fence control.
He could reset, but DDP attacked the rebuild before the system started again.

That was the real story of Dricus Du Plessis vs. Kamaru Usman.

Age increased the difficulty, and size increased the cost.

But Du Plessis created the mechanism.

He separated Usman’s weapons from one another.

Without the jab organizing the pressure, without the pressure creating the fence, and without the fence hiding the wrestling, Usman was left fighting in separate pieces.

DDP spent five rounds making sure those pieces never became a complete fight.